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Animal Souls, Metempsychosis, 
and Theodicy in Seventeenth- 
Century English Thought 
P E T E R  H A R R I S O N  
1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
ONE or THE MOST wide-ranging discussions in seventeenth-century England 
concerned the status of animal creation. In Tudor  England it was generally 
accepted that animals had been placed in the world to be at the disposal of  
man. ~ If  there were those who doubted human sovereignty over the natural 
world, they needed only consult the classics, the Fathers, or scripture to have 
their doubts allayed. Genesis taught that man had been given dominion over 
nature, a principle reinforced by Aristotle's view that "nature has made all the 
animals for the sake of  men.", For Aristotle, human superiority lay in the fact 
that while plants possessed a vegetative soul, and animals a sensitive soul, 
humans boasted a rational soul.s This view was endorsed by Augustine and 
Aquinas, both of  whom suggested that we owe no direct duties to animals, on 
account of  their inferior, irrational souls.4 Thus, Augustine declared that 
"when we say, Thou shalt not kill, we do not understand this of  the plants, 
since they have no sensation, nor of  the irrational animals that fly, swim, walk 
or creep, since they are dissociated from us by want of reason, and are there- 
fore by the just appointment O f the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive 
1 See Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World (London: Penguin Books, 1983), ch. I. 
' Aristotle, Politics, I.iii. 7 (Loeb ed.). 
s Aristotle, N.E.I.xiii; De gen. an. 736a-b; De anima 415 a. 
4See, e.g., Augustine, City of God, tr. Marcus Dodds (New York: Modern Library, a95o), 
XXlI.24 (p. 851); The Catholic and Ma~ichean Ways of Life, tr. D. A. Gallagher and I. J. Gallagher 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1966), ch. XVII (pp. 1o2, 1o5); Aquinas, 
Sancti Thomas Aquinatis in Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium, ed. M. Pirotta (Turin, 1925), w167 
255, 26o, 279; Summa theologiae, 1a.78, i. 
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for  o u r  own uses."~ Considerat ions  such as these f o r m e d  the weighty intellec- 
tual ped ig ree  o f  the early m o d e r n  view of  the h u m a n  relat ionship to the 
animal world.  
T o  some extent ,  this c o m m o n  concept ion  o f  the subservience o f  na tu re  to 
h u m a n  ends  h a r d e n e d  into an even more  rigid o r thodoxy  with the growth  o f  
natural  science and  the advent  o f  the mechanical  model  o f  nature .  6 Francis 
Bacon's influential  p r o g r a m m e  for  the renovat ion  o f  science, ar t iculated in 
the early 16oos, was based on the assumption that  na tu re  only yields u p  he r  
secrets "when  by ar t  and  the hand  o f  man  she is forced  out  o f  he r  na tura l  
state, and  squeezed and  moulded."7 Animals came to play an impor tan t ,  i f  
un fo r tuna te ,  role in the bu rgeon ing  life sciences, now modif ied a long the lines 
o f  the Baconian model .  On  vivisecting tables, in vacuum chambers ,  a t tached to 
n u m e r o u s  contrapt ions ,  they served as the hapless in termediar ies  be tween  
ruthlessly cur ious h u m a n  in te r rogators  and  an apparen t ly  inert  and  unco-  
operat ive  Nature .  8 A d d e d  impetus  for  this inquisitorial concept ion o f  science 
came f rom Descartes's bold new mechanist ic vision o f  nature .  Physical bodies,  
according to the Cartesian hypothesis,  were merely  machines no m o r e  sen- 
t ient than the material  e lements  which consti tuted them.  Mechanism became  
the dominan t  m o d e  o f  scientific explanat ion,  and animals were cons idered  by 
Cartesians to be be re f t  o f  reason and feeling, in short ,  to be wi thout  souls. 
F rom about  the middle  o f  the seventeenth  century,  this view was to exe r t  
considerable  inf luence in England.  
Yet the seventeenth  century  also witnessed a countervai l ing tendency.  T h e  
growing practice o f  pe t -keeping  wrough t  new relat ionships between peop le  
and animals.9 Cer ta in  animals were now cared for  not  because o f  any labor  
which they might  pe r fo rm ,  n o r  on  account  o f  thei r  nutr i t ional  value, bu t  
pr imari ly because they could provide  c o m p a n i o n s h i p - - a  role h i ther to  per-  
f o rmed  only by o the r  persons.  T h ese  new relationships between h u man s  and  
par t icular  animals chal lenged the view that  no duties were owed to animals,  
and gave rise to f u r t h e r  questions about  the na tu re  o f  an imals - -ques t ions  
which until  this t ime had  only been  asked about  h u m a n  subjects: W ere  ani- 
5 Augustine, City of God, 1.2o (p. 26). 
6See, e.g., Caroline Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 198o), ch. 7; John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature 
(London: Duckworth, 1974), 18-91; Robin Attfield, "Christian Attitudes to Nature," Journal of the 
History ofldeas 44 (1983): 369 -86, esp. 38of. 
Francis Bacon, Cogitationes de natura return, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding, R. 
Ellis, and D. Harth (London: Longman, 1857-74), llI, 99. 
s See Anita Guerrini, "The Ethics of Animal Experimentation in Seventeenth-Century En- 
gland,"Journal of the History ofldeas 5 ~ (1989): 391-4o7; Brian Klug, "Lab Animals, Francis Bacon 
and the Culture of Science," Listening 18 0983): 54-79. 
9Thomas, Man and the Natural World, ch. 3. 
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mals immortal? Did they go to heaven? Could they have inklings of  moral 
responsibility? These concerns were reinforced by reactions against both the 
fashionable mechanical conception of  nature and the older Aristotelian 
model. The Cambridge Platonists, along with such figures as'Franciscus Mer- 
curius van Helmont, Lady Anne Conway, and certain of  the English radicals, 
put forward alternative, animistic views of  nature. ~o The Platonists, while 
attracted to Descartes's dualism, came to reject his conception of  nature as a 
spiritual vacuum, proposing instead that animating spiritual forces were op- 
erable in the external world. Others went still further, insisting that the whole 
of  Nature was pervaded by, or even identified with, the Divine spirit. Such 
views served to bring man closer to the natural order and to the animal world 
over which he was supposed to rule. 
These ideas, then, form the broad parameters of the seventeenth-century 
discussion of  animals and their place in the created order. At one extreme was 
the Cartesian beast-machine hypothesis, at the other, versions of  panpsychism 
which saw no difference in kind between man and the other animals. In the 
middle were the conservative Aristotelians and the Cambridge Platonists. 
Each view had serious ramifications for biology, the sciences in general, and 
even politics. But as we shall see, even more important were the religious 
implications of  such views--implications which were to place limits on the 
sorts of  entities that animals could be. Of  major concern to virtually all who 
ventured an opinion about the nature of  animals was how the benevolence of  
God could be reconciled with the suffering of  his creatures. Much of  the 
seventeenth-century debate about animal souls thus revolved around the ques- 
tion of  theodicy. In the discussion which follows we shall deal first with 
Malebranche's adaptation of  Descartes, the theological justifications of  the 
beast-machine, and reactions to the Cartesian view in England. Second, we 
shall consider Platonist alternatives to Cartesianism, and how Platonic views of  
the soul were similarly informed by theodicy. Finally, the less orthodox specu- 
lations of  the English radicals and Lady Anne Conway--both  of  whom enter- 
tained notions of  metempsychosis or "transmutation"--shall be examined. 
2.  M A L E B R A N C H E ,  T H E  B E A S T - M A C H I N E ,  AND A N I M A L  H E A V E N  
Descartes, notoriously, maintained that animals were merely biological ma- 
chines, capable of  complex behaviors, yet devoid of  mental experiences of  any 
kind. Against the numerous peripatetics who followed Aristotle and Aquinas 
*~ group coincides roughly with what Richard Popkin has termed the "third force" in 
seventeenth-century philosophy. He regards More, van Helmont and Conway as the major fig- 
ures of  the movement. See "The Third Force in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy: Scepticism, 
Science and Biblical Prophecy," Nouvelles de la R~publique des Lettres 1 (1983-84): 35-63. 
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in asserting that  conscious sensation could occur  in the nonra t iona l  soul, 
Descartes held  that  bo th  reason and percept ion  are  mental  events which can 
take place only in incorporea l  (that is, spiritual and  immortal)  substances. I f  
beasts did not  have incorporeal ,  immortal ,  and reasoning souls, then  they 
were ipsofacto  incapable o f  fee l ing."  Animals, in Descartes's scheme, d id  no t  
possess immor ta l  souls, and  as a result  could not  be the subjects o f  menta l  
events. 
9 T h e  sceptical Pierre  Bayle wryly observed that  the theological advantages  
o f  Descartes's thesis more  than compensa ted  for  its improbability,  and  indeed  
the advantages were considerable.  TM At a general  level, Cartesianism stressed 
the reality and  pr imacy o f  the spiritual realm at a t ime when materialism, then  
p resumed  to be inherent ly  atheistic, was making inroads on  tradit ional  reli- 
gious concept ions  o f  na ture .  Animal mechanism, which in re t rospec t  seems 
incipiently materialistic, was then  held by many to magnify  the glory o f  the 
Creator ,  who by design so regula ted  the activities o f  the brutes  that, t h o u g h  
devoid o f  reason,  they act reasonably.  An o th e r  advantage o f  Descartes's denial  
o f  the existence o f  animal souls has to do  with safeguard ing  the goodness  o f  
God. T h e  suf fe r ing  o f  c rea tures  which have done  noth ing  to ea rn  thei r  misery 
and have no  hope  o f  happiness  in a fu tu re  state seems to i mp u g n  the just ice  o f  
God. If, however ,  animals did not  feel pain, God's  goodness,  at least in that  
regard,  could be upheld .  P roponen t s  o f  the s tandard  Aristotelian p o s i t i o n - -  
according to which animals possessed sensitive sou l s - -had  to face o ther ,  
equally awkward,  questions. Were  these animal souls immortal?  What  became 
o f  them at the dea th  o f  the animal? Would they simply be annihi lated o r  might  
they p roceed  to heaven or  hell? Could they r een te r  o the r  bodies, animal  or  
human?  T h e s e  difficulties were  most easily resolved by deny ing  that animals 
had incorporeal ,  immorta l  souls. 
Despite these advantages,  Descartes's thesis o f  animal automat ism was not  
primari ly an apology for  theism, but  ra the r  a p roduc t  o f  his dualistic meta-  
physics. While at times he  stressed its theological implications, in the main  it 
was left to his disciple Nicolas Malebranche to spell these out  in detail. 
Malebranche broached  the prob lem o f  the animal soul in the classic De la 
recherche de la v~rit~ 0 6 7 4 - 7 5 ) . ' 3  T h e  most succinct s ta tement  o f  his position, 
"John Cottingham has argued that Descartes did not deny feeling to brutes, but merely 
insisted that they were automata. See Cottingham, " "A Brute to the Brutes?': Descartes' Treat- 
ment of Animals," Philosophy 53 (1978): 551-61. Admittedly, Descartes did not emphasize this 
aspect of his theory, but it nonetheless seems an inevitable conclusion of his denial of animal souls. 
See Peter Harrison, "Descartes on Animals," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (a99~): 219-~ 7. 
'" Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (Rotterdam: Leers, 1697), "Rorarius," n. C. 
*s Nicolas Malebranche, Recherche de la v~cit~, IV, XI, w iii, in Oeuvres Completes, ed. G. Rodis- 
Lewis (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958-7o ), II, lo 4. 
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however, comes in the Defence against the Accusations of M. de la Ville (1677).~4 It 
is the common opinion, says Malebranche, that all beasts have souls and are 
"susceptible of  all the Motions of  the Passions, Fear, Desire, Envy, Hatred, Joy, 
Sorrow." Yet this opinion, Malebranche points out, gives rise to consequences 
directly opposite to what we are taught by faith: "Now they [animals] never 
sinn'd, or made ill use of  their Libirty [s/c], since they have none: Therefore  
God's Unjust, in punishing them, and making them Miserable; and unequally 
Miserable, since they are equally innocent."~5 Malebranche goes on to point 
out that men, in any case, have the possibility of  recompense in a future life 
for ills suffered in the present. It follows that if God renders justice to all his 
creatures, then animals must be incapable of  suffering, for they have neither 
committed wrong, nor have they the opportunity for compensation in a fu- 
ture life. Malebranche also deals with the argument, implicit in both Thomism 
and Calvinism, that God may deal with the beasts as he sees fit. To see the 
error  of  this view, says Malebranche, we need only consider the hierarchy of  
being. What if angels were to insist that God treat them justly, yet not insist on 
his doing justice to men? God, he concludes, "renders Justice to all his Crea- 
tures; and if the meanest of  them are liable to Misery, they must needs be 
capable of  being Criminal. ''~6 
Malebranche's argument was in fact an adaptation of  an old Augustinian 
p r inc ip le Jone  destined to become the point of  departure for virtually all 
seventeenth-century discussions of  animal suffering. Early in the fifth cen- 
tury, at the height o f  his dispute with the Pelagians, Augustine formulated the 
principle sub Deo justo, nemo miser nisii (under a just God, no innocent suf- 
fers).,7 The bishop of  Hippo deployed this principle against his opponents to 
establish original sin. It is clear, he said, that many infants suffer. Under  a just  
God, therefore, they cannot be innocent. (For Augustine this meant that they 
must have inherited guilt as a result of  Adam's original trespass.) Expressing 
the matter formally: 
l) Under  a just  God, no innocent suffers. 
~) Infants suffer, therefore, 
3) Infants are not innocent (i.e., they bear originnal sin). 
Malebranche had introduced his own minor premise, resulting in this syllo- 
gism: 
,4 Published in one of the English translations of Recherche--Father Malebranche, His Treatise 
concerning the Search after Truth, and ed., tr. T. Taylor (London: Pr. by W. Bowyer, for Thomas 
Bennet, 17oo ). 
,5 Ibid., 185. 
~ Ibid. 
'7 Augustine, Against Julian, bk. III, chs. 3, 5. 
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I) Under a just God, no innocent suffers. 
2) Animals are innocent, therefore, 
3) Animals do not suffer. 's 
Malebranche's theological reinforcement of Descartes's biology found favor 
with a number of  continental thinkers, many of whom rehearsed his argu- 
ments in their own writings.'9 More significantly for our purposes, the beast- 
machine, along with its theological justifications, found its way across the 
channel. 
While it has been maintained in some quarters that animal aut6matism was 
universally condemned in England, '~ a number of  influential writers gave it 
qualified support. Sir Kenelm Digby was one. Digby and his mentor Thomas 
White were the first Englishmen to formulate a mechanical philosophy.,~ While 
Digby claimed that his atomism was essentially Aristotelian in character,," there 
is little doubt that he was strongly influenced by Descartes. In I645, he an- 
nounced that "Mounsieur des Cartes" was "the first that I have ever met with, 
who hath published any conceptions of  this nature, whereby to make the opera- 
tions of sense intelligible.",n His enthusiasm for Descartes extended to the 
hypothesis of  the beast-machine, which sat as well with his atomic materialism as 
with Cartesian dualism. The apparently intelligent behavior of  animals, accord- 
ing to Digby, was a credit not to the ingenuity of the creature, but to the Creator 
who had so fashioned these contrivances to perform such feats. Thus animals 
"are but material instruments to performe without their knowledge or re- 
flexion, a superior reasons counsels: even as in a clocke, that is composed of  
severall pieces and wheeles, all the parts of  it doe conspire to give notice of  the 
Js Malebranche, Recherche de la v~rit~, IV, XI, w iii (Oeuvres Completes, II, 1o4). 
~0 Antoine Dilly, De l'dme des b~tes (Lyon: Anisson & Poysuel, 1676), 96-99; Jean Darmanson, 
La Beste transforr~e en machine (Amsterdam, 1684), 22f.; Franqois Bayle, Institutiones physicae ad 
usum scholarum accom0datae 3 tom., (Tolosae, 17oo), II, 645-54; Florentius Schuyl, "Ad Lec- 
torum," in Renatus Des Cartes. De Homine. Fig'uris et latinitate donatus a Florentio Schuyl (Apud 
Franciscum Moyardum & Petrum Leffen: Lugduni Batavorum, 1662). See also Leonora 
Rosenfieid, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine (New York: Octagon, 1968 ), and Hester Hastings, 
Man and Beast in French Thought of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1936 ). 
2o See e.g., Sterling Lamprecht, The Role of Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England, Columbia 
University Studies in the History of Ideas (1935), iii, 181-24o; Leonora Cohen [Rosenfield], 
"Descartes and Henry  More on the Beast Machine," Annals of Science x (1936): 48-61. Even the 
more recent article by Wallace Shugg, "The Cartesian Beast-Machine in English Literature," 
Journal of the History ofldeas 29 (1968): 279-92 , concludes that in England "all poets, essayists, and 
journalists rejected the doctrine of the beast-machine" (~9~). 
9 ' See B. Dobbs, "Studies in the Natural Philosophy of Sir Kenelm Digby," Arab/x, a8 097x): 
1 - - 2  5 . 
2, Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises, in the one of which, The Nature of Bodies, in the other, The Nature of 
Mans Soule, is looked into (London: Pr. for John Williams, 1645), 343. 
2s Ibid., 335. 
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severa l l . . ,  periods of time, which the maker hath ordered it for."~4 In an 
anecdote which was to become commonplace in subsequent writings on the 
subject, Digby further  reports that a certain king of  China on first encountering 
a watch mistook it for a living creature. All men are to be excused, he goes on to 
say, for making a similar error with the beasts. Instead of  marvelling at the 
intelligence of  the creature, the structure and behavior of  creatures ought to 
lead us to "straine higher, and looke with reverence and duty upon the immen- 
sity of  that provident Architect, out of  whose hands these masterpieces issue, 
and unto whom it is as easie to make a chaine of  causes of  a thousand or of  a 
million of  links, as to make one linke alone."'~ 
In 1675, Antoine Le Grand's Dissertatio de carentia sensus et cognitionis in brutis 
was published in London. This work set forth a theory of  animal mechanism 
identical in most important respects to those of  Descartes and Digby. '6 But far 
more popular was the translation of  his primer in Cartesian philosophy--An 
Entire Body of Philosophy, according to the Principles of the Famous Renate des Cartes-- 
which appeared almost twenty years later, in 1694. Here again, we find the 
beast-machine: "A Beast is an Artificial Engin or Machine of GOD, furnish'd 
with a various and wonderful structure of Organs, containing in it self a mate- 
rial Principle of Life, Motion and Sense.",7 Edward Tyson followed suit in his 
preface to Swammerdam's Ephemera vita (x 681), stating that the kingdom of 
God receives "no small honour," from the study of  the "extraordinary mecha- 
nism" of  the ephemeron ("a fly that lives but five hours"). To understand "how 
'tis that Nature gives Life and Motions to these Automata," he says, we must 
"unloose the Case, and take asunder the several Wheels and Springs, and 
carefully observe how shejoyns them all together. '',s Such expressions were not 
uncommon in the second half of the seventeenth century, and while they may 
not necessarily entail a full endorsement of Descartes's view, certainly they show 
the positive influence of  his ideas. Thus, Henry Power spoke of  "Insectile 
Automata," and "prety engines,"~9 and the poet Richard Leigh observed that 
9 4 Ibid., 399" 
9 s Ibid., 400. 
9 SAntoine Le Grand, Dissertatio de carentia sensus et cognitionis in brutis (Londini: J. Martyn, 
1675), 17, 57, 61. 
27Antoine Le Grand, An Entire Body of Philosophy (London: Pr. by Samuel Roycroft, 1694), 
254. 
gSjo. Swammerdam, Ephemera Vita or The Natural History and Anatomy of the Ephemeron (Lon- 
don: Pr. by Henry Fairthorn, 1681). Tyson was the author of  a number of  monographs on the 
anatomy of specific animals. Swammerdam's own view seems not to have extended beyond a 
general but nonetheless thoroughgoing providentialism. See, e.g., his Book of Nature, tr. Thomas 
Flloyd (London: John Hill, 1758), 7, i x7-18, 159. 
9 gExperimental Philosophy (London: Pr. by T. Roycroft and James Allestry, for John Martin, 
a664), preface, quoted in Shugg, "Beast-Machine in English Literature," 281. 
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insects are like "living watches" which contain "a thousand  Springs of Life, and  
moving Wheels. "30 
In  England,  then,  many  were familiar  with the thesis, and some were sympa- 
thetic, yet few o f  its suppor te rs  progressed  beyond a general  providential ism to 
address  the issue o f  theodicy as Malebranche  had done.  T h e  most p r o m i n e n t  
wri ter  to do  so was J o h n  Norris.  Norr is  was a man  o f  many parts. H e  was an 
enthusiastic p r o p o n e n t  o f  Malebranche 's  phi losophy,  which necessarily placed 
him in opposi t ion t o J o h n  Locke. In  addit ion,  he was deeply  inf luenced by the 
Cambr idge  Platonists, and  had carr ied  on  a co r re spondence  with H e n r y  More.  
This  influence, however ,  did not  ex tend  to his views on  the na ture  o f  animals. 
In  his Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (17o4), Norr is  
includes a lengthy "Digression concern ing  the Souls o f  Brutes,  whe the r  they 
have any T h o u g h t  o f  Sensation in them or  no."sl H e r e  he restates the Cartes ian 
position with approval ,  and  details its theological advantages.  
Like the others ,  Norr is  stresses the provident ial  aspects o f  animal au toma-  
tism. T h e  acdons o f  brutes  may "be the result  o f  p u re  Mechanism," for  "God,  i f  
he  pleases so far  to exer t  his Power,  may make a Company  o f  Machines that  
shall do  jus t  as they do, and have the same appearance  o f  T h o u g h t  which they 
have. Animals thus bear  witness to the Infinite Wisdom and Power o f  God."s,  
However ,  Norr is  also makes specific r e fe rence  to the a rg u men t  o f  "St. Aust in" 
(whom, he  notes, Malebranche  also cites). He  draws the same conclusion: 
"Brutes  are innocent ,  t he r e fo r e  they are not  miserable . . . .  But  then  they must  
have no Sense or  Percept ion,  since if they have, 'tis plain that they are of ten  mis- 
erable or in pain."ss Norr is  concludes  his digression with a plea for  kindness  to 
animals, his views about  their  lacking sensations notwithstanding,  for,  t hough  
"Reason does most  favour  the side which denies all T h o u g h t  and  Percept ion  to 
animals, y e t . . ,  ou r  Reason [may] deceive us, as 'tis easy to e r r  in the Dark."34 
Norris  had not  been  the first Engl ishman to point  out  the theological 
advantages o f  animal au tomat i sm in this way. This  h o n o r  fell to one  "T. B.," a 
co r r e sponden t  to The Athenian Gazette.35 Brutes,  an n o u n ced  T.  B. in his 1693 
so"Greatness in Little," Poems by Richard Leigh 0675), quoted in Shugg, "Beast-Machine in 
English Literature." 
3'John Norris, Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World, pt. II (London: Pr. for S. 
Manship, 17o4), 58-1oo. This section is actually a very good summary of the arguments for the 
Cartesian position. 
32 Ibid., 9 a. 
as Ibid., 75-76 . 
vt Ibid., loo, cf. 59. 
ss It is possible that T.B. and John Norris were one and the same. John Norris was closely 
associated with the three founders of The Athenian Gazette--John Dunton, Samuel Wesley, and 
Richard Sault. The four were responsible for answering queries sent to the Gazette. This makes it 
likely that "T.B." was Norris's mouthpiece. Alternatively, Norris might have appropriated the 
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letter tO the paper ,  "have no Souls, bu t  are p u r e  Machines, or  a sort  o f  Clock 
work, devoid o f  any sense o f  Pain, Pleasure, Desire, Hope ,  Fear  &c.," and to 
assert the contrary,  he  continues,  would he to impugn  the just ice  o f  God: 
"Brutes  have never  made  ill use o f  their  Liberty,  and those Natura l  Powers 
which they receiv 'd in their  first Creat ion;  t he re fo re  if  God  pun i shed  them 
with pain, and  makes them not  only unhappy ,  but  equally u n h a p p y ,  who are 
all equally I n n o c e n t . . .  then  I can ' t  see how God  can be jus t  . . . .  "a6 He  also 
points out  that  if  we attribute incorporea l  souls to animals, we must  take 
account  o f  what  happens  to that soul at the dea th  o f  the animal.  T h e  general  
bel ief  that  the beast's soul is annihi la ted at dea th  leads to the conclusion that  
animals, unlike humans  who in the afterl ife have a chance o f  r ecompense  for  
the ills o f  the presen t  world, "have been  u n h a p p y  and innocent ,  wi thout  any 
expectat ion o f  a fu tu re  recompense ."  But  why then  would God instill in ani- 
mals a soul which was incorporeal ,  and  hence  naturally immorta l ,  only to 
annihilate it at the animal's demise? This  is e i ther  unnecessary o r  unjust.  This  
co r r e sponden t  hoped ,  in conclusion,  that  the Gazette would be able to provide  
a satisfactory response  to the di lemma,  not  only for  himself,  but  for  "all 
Cartesians" and  " the rest o f  the World ."  
As it t u rned  out,  the newspaper ,  whose stated aim was to resolve "all the 
most  nice and curious questions p roposed  by the ingenious," p r in ted  in the 
same issue a re jo inder  by "R. S." (probably Richard Sault, mathemat ic ian  and 
amateur  theologian).  F rom this response  it can be in fe r red  that  the Cartesian 
view was not  simply the preserve o f  an isolated few. "When  I first engaged  in 
this Subject," writes R. S., "I was very  sensible what N u m e r o u s  and  Lea rned  
Adversaries  I had to deal with, there  being scarce any o f  o u r  M o d e r n  Philoso- 
phers  who are not  Cartesians."s7 Brutes,  he goes on to say, in t rue  August inian 
fashion, were made  for  man's service and use, and it follows that  the pains 
u n d e r  which they labor result  f r o m  Adam's  transgression. Animals are thus 
implicated in original  sin. T h e  souls o f  brutes,  moreover ,  are immaterial ,  and 
when the animal body dies, they may be annihilated,  they may migrate  into 
o the r  bodies, or  they may "wander  u p  and down these lower Regions,  'till the 
t ime spoken o f  by St. Paul," when "the creature shall be deliver'd from the Bondage 
views of this correspondent in his later work. Both John Dunton and Richard Sault, incidentally, 
were also enthusiastic followers of Malebranche, the latter having translated into English both the 
Recherche and the TraitS, in 1694 and 1695 respectively. For the influence of Malebranche's 
philosophy on the Athenian circle, see C. J. McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (Ox- 
ford: Clarendon, 1983), 4 f. 
s6The Athenian Mercury, Saturday, February I l, 1693 (vol. 9, no. 18). (The Athenian Gazette 
became The Athenian Mercury in the second number, perhaps because of the proximity of the 
original title to the more established London Gazette.) 
sT Ibid. 
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of  Corruption."s 8 This  last opt ion,  which R. S. personal ly  favored ,  relies on  a 
passage in R o m a n s  in which Paul speaks  o f  the whole o f  creat ion as awai t ing 
r e d e m p t i o n ,  which it will eventual ly receive.39 Accord ing  to R. S., s u p p o r t  fo r  
this last view came  f r o m  "a very Pious, L e a r n e d  Divine," who  had  a p p a r e n t l y  
told a g r o u p  o f  his f r iends  that  "God Almighty may for  his own Glory make some use 
or other o f  all Creatures in another Life, perhaps for  the service o f  Glorified Bodies, 
since he sees no ~'eason f o r  the annihilation o f  their Souls."40 Animals ,  then,  m i g h t  
well go to heaven ,  which would seem to solve the difficulty. 
A significant n u m b e r  o f  seven teen th -cen tu ry  divines had  p o n d e r e d  the  
possibility o f  the  final r e d e m p t i o n  o f  the  animal  world.4, I f  the fate o f  an imals  
was so closely b o u n d  u p  with that  o f  h u m a n s - - a s  not ions o f  their  su f fe r ing  as 
a result  o f  the Fall would  s u g g e s t - - t h e n  they migh t  also have  a place in God ' s  
r e d e m p t i v e  plan. I f  animals  could fall with Adam,  migh t  they not  also be  
raised with Christ? As Geo rge  Abbo t  pu t  it, because " the re  is such affinitie 
be tweene  man ,  and  the beastes which a re  subjected to his vse, that  the  sor- 
rowes o f  the be t t e r  do  easily touch  the worser ,"  it should  follow that  on  the  day  
o f  j u d g m e n t  the beasts "shall r e t u rne  to that  beautie ,  where in  they at  first 
were  established."4~ T h o m a s  Wilson concur red .  Crea tures ,  he  said, "be ing  
liable and  subiect  vn to  labour ,  wear inesse  yea and  dea th  fo r  o u r  sakes," shall 
enjoy a res t i tut ion "like the resur rec t ion  f r o m  the dead."4s 
Unf o r t una t e l y  the  re levant  passage  in R o m a n s  does  not  specify the ex ten t  
o f  this genera l  rest i tut ion.  T h u s  exegetes  d i f fe red  in thei r  views on  precisely 
which living things were  to make  the i r  a p p e a r a n c e  in heaven.  Poet  H e n r y  
V a u g h a n  spoke  o f  the  res tora t ion  o f " t r e e s ,  beasts and  men."44 G o d f r e y  Good-  
ss Ibid. 
s9 Romans 8: a9-2~. 
4o This divine was in all likelihood Samuel Wesley, member of the Athenian Society and father 
of the Methodist John. (In that case, father and son shared similar views on the matter. See John 
Wesley, "The General Deliverance" D788], Sermon LX in Works, i lth ed. [London: John Mason, 
1856]; VI, 2~6-37.) This whole issue might well have been discussed by Norris, Sauh, and Wesley 
in one of their editorial meetings at Smith's Coffee House in Stock's Market. 
4~ Thomas Edwards actually lists the belief in animal resurrection as one of the errors of the 
sectaries, despite the fact that it was taught by a number of respectable divines. See Gangr~na, ~nd 
ed. (London: Pr. for Ralph Smith, 1646), 27. Also see Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 137-49. 
4, George Abbot, An Exposition vpon the Prophet Ionah (London: Imprinted by Richard Field, 
16oo), 466. 
43 Thomas Wilson, A Commentarie vpon the most Diuine Epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes (London: 
Pr. by W. Iaggard, a614), 59 l, 589 9 Also William Cowper, Heaven Opened, in Works, 2nd ed. 
(London: Robert Allott, 1629), 115f.; Thomas Hodges, The Creatures Goodness, as they came out of 
God's Hands (London: Pr. for Tho. Parkhurst, 1675), 15--18; Nathaniel Homes, A~roxa~wpot~ 
~vaoraoeo;. The Resurrection Revealed (London: Pr. by Robert Ibbitson, 1653), 528f. 
44 "The Book," Silex Scintillans, II. For the background of Henry Vaughan's views, see Alan 
Rudrum, "Research Reports, VI: Theology and Politics in Seventeenth-Century England," The 
Clark Newsletter 15 0988): 5-7. 
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m a n  cla imed that  "by a course  o f  i u s t i c e . . ,  all the Creatures in general l  shall 
pa r t ake  with vs, in o u r  fu tu re  in t ended  renouation."45 Richard  O v e r t o n  con- 
cur red :  "all o the r  Crea tu res  as well as m a n  shall be raised and  del ivered f r o m  
Death  at  the Resurrection."46 Othe r s  were  less generous .  G. H. G e n t  p o u r e d  
scorn u p o n  those who, with Over ton ,  looked fo rward  to an e terni ty  with "all 
the T o a d s  and  Frogs  and  poysonous  Serpents ."  " Those  who  are  to live 
a m o n g s t  all these," he  sagely observed,  "are  likely to have  a gallant  t ime o f  
it."47 William Gea r ing  shared  Gent ' s  foresight ,  p ropos ing  that  " those  Crea-  
tures  which are  b r ed  o f  d u n g  and co r rup t ion"  a long with " T h o r n e s ,  Thist les,  
Briars,  and  such like" be excluded f r o m  the heavenly  company.4S T h o m a s  
Draxe  similarly t h o u g h t  that  thistles, br iars  and  brambles ,  mules,  wolf  dogs  
and  wol f  bitches, m o n s t r o u s  creatures ,  and  crea tures  b r ed  f r o m  co r rup t i on  
such as "frogs,  flies, wormes ,  mouldes ,  mise, crickets, bats, barnacles"  would  
not  take their  place amongs t  the saints. In  fact, Draxe  t hough t  that  only 
cer ta in  o f  those animals  still living w h e n  Chris t  r e t u r n e d  qualified fo r  i m m o r -  
tality.49 Elna than  Par r  favored  the view that  heaven  would conta in  " some  
singulars  o f  all k inds , " jus t  as Noah  had  p rese rved  some o f  each species in the  
Ark.5o T h o m a s  H o r t o n  was o f  the s ame  opinion,  a rgu ing  that  a genera l  resur -  
rect ion o f  beasts was absu rd  and  unbiblical. I t  is sufficient, he states, that  "all 
kinds o f  the C r e a t u r e  are  perfected, t h o u g h  many,  yea mos t  o f  the Par t iculars  
and  Individuals  a re  extinguished."5~ 
A n o t h e r  solution to the c o n u n d r u m  o f  the unjustly miserable  condi t ion 
o f  b r u t e s - - a  solution which for  the  mos t  pa r t  was over looked  in the seven- 
teen th  c e n t u r y - - w a s  that  the su f fe r ing  o f  animals  migh t  be caused by de-  
45Godfrey Goodman, The Creatvres Praysing God (London: Pr. by Felik Kingston, a622), 29 
(my emphasis). 
46 Richard Overton, Marts Mortallitie (Amsterdam [London]: Pr. by John Crane, 1643 ), 5 o. 
47G. H. Gent, The Grand Prerogative of Human Nature (London: Pr. by Roger Daniel, x653), 
1 lo. Against Gent it could be argued that those creatures antipathetic to man were only so as a 
result of the Fall. In the general restoration, they would be restored to their original (and 
presumably more amiable) perfection. See, e.g., Homes, A~roxo.~v~poL~ Avaoraoeo;, 89, 19o, 
5~8-3o; Hodges, The Creatures Goodness, 17f. (Aquinas, incidentally, suggested that there would 
have been a natural antipathy between some creatures even if sin had never entered the world. 
Summa theologiae, 1a.96, l.) 
48 William Gearing, A Prospect of Heaven (London: Pr. for Tho. Passenger, and Benj. Hurlock, 
1673), 98f. 
49Thomas Draxe, The Earnest of Ovr Inheritance (London: Imprinted by F. K. for George 
Norton), 5 f. 
so Elnathan Parr, A Plaine Exposition vpon. . .  Romanes (London: Pr. by George Purslowe for 
Samuel Man, 162o), 89f. 
5, Thomas Horton, Forty Six Sermons upon the Whole Eighth Chapter o f . . .  Romans (London: Pr. 
by A. Maxwell for Tho. Parkhurst, 1674 ), 369 f. The good Doctor Horton seems to have relied 
heavily upon Thomas Wilson for his views on the matter. 
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mons.5, Thomas Wilson, in a passing remark, noted that part of  the bondage 
of  the creature lies in the fact that "all of  them are forced to doe seruice vnto 
the diuels, which range in the aire."ss This sentiment was echoed in William 
Cowper's suggestion that the devil "accounts a beast his prey," in order that 
he might indirectly torment mankind.54 Neither pursued the thesis with any 
great vigor. More than a century later, however, Ptre  Bougeant's Amusement 
philosophique sur le langage des bestes 0739) set out with mock seriousness the 
view that animals were actually embodied demons. This explained both their 
suffering, which they deserved, and their apparent intelligence.55 Bougeant's 
Jesuit colleagues failed to appreciate his humor, however, and he was forced 
to retract a number  of  offending passages. The thesis also excited contro- 
versy in Britain, where it appeared in two separate translations.56 
Future rewards for animals, then, seemed to provide the best compromise 
between the demands of  orthodox belief on the one hand, and justice for 
creatures on the other. Of  the remaining possibilities, annihilation of  animal 
souls was orthodox, and meshed neatly with the view that animals were cre- 
ated for the sake of  man. Radical Gerrard Winstanley, for example, asserted a 
universal salvation for all mankind at the end times, but excluded the beasts: 
"In the end every man shall be saved . . .  other creatures which were made 
only for man's use, will be dissolved into nothing."57 More conservative writ- 
ers, of whom there were many, also inclined towards this opinion.sS Others 
5~ This has also been suggested quite recently. See, e.g., Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), x49f.; Richard Swinburne, "The Problem of Evil," Con- 
temporary Philosophy of Religion, ed. S. Cahn and D. Shatz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
5s Thomas Wilson, Commentarie vpon Romanes, 587 . 
~4 William Cowper, Works, 116. 
55 Ptre Bougeant, Amusement philosophique sur le langage des bestes (Paris, 1739). Bougeant also 
relied upon the Augustinian principle sub Deo justo, nemo miser nisii, but his application of the 
syllogism led to the conclusion that the beasts, on account of  their suffering, must be "culpable 
victims of divine vengeance" (43f.). The  souls of animals, in Bougeant's system of philosophy, 
had incurred the wrath of the deity in a preexistent state, and were condemned, as a result of  
their infractions, to be imprisoned in the bodies of  lower creatures. Bougeant thus took the logic 
of  the English Platonists one step further, reasoning that if the souls of  fallen angels could 
inhabit the bodies of  savages, they could as easily inhabit the bodies of  brutes. At an animal's 
death, the evicted devil was reincarnated by chance into the embryo of  "a bird, a fish, or a 
butterfly." A fortunate few might be embodied in pampered pets. Others, less favored by 
fortune are confined in the bodies of  beasts of  burden or live under the constant threat of  the 
hunter's knife (56-58). 
56Two London editions, printed for T. Cooper, appeared in 1739 and 174o, while another 
translation was published in Dublin, printed by Cor. Wynne, again in 1739. 
sT Gerrard Winstanley, The Mysterie of God concerning the Whole Creation 0648), in Works, ed. 
George H. Sabine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1941), 8~. 
5s John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (London: Pr. for Samuel 
Smith, 1691), 39; Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, ed. John Harrison, 3 
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Who advocated annihilation did so in the belief that animals have no claims on 
the justice of God, whose authority as creator is absolute. As Thomas Browne 
put it, "Shall the vessel say to the potter, 'Why hast thou made me thus?' " 
"Men that live according to the right rule and law of  reason," he continues, 
"live but in their own kind--as beasts do in theirs, who justly obey the pre- 
script of  their n a t u r e s n a n d  therefore cannot reasonably demand a reward 
for their actions . . . .  "59 For Browne and others like him, the question of the 
fate of animal souls was related to a wider discussion about the salvation of  
virtuous pagans who had led blameless lives. Whereas human standards of 
justice might suggest that such innocence or virtue be rewarded, or at least go 
unpunished, Browne and his ilk implied that divine justice was different in 
kind from human justice, and consequently that there was no reason why, at 
death, animals or noble pagans should expect more than oblivion, or consider- 
ably worse. Annihilation of  animal souls was no t  so much the solution to a 
problem, as a refusal to admit that one existed. 6~ 
For many, the idea that God's justice was of a different order from natural 
justice was highly problematic. English Platonists flatly denied this narrow 
conception of  the righteousness of  God, and in their attempts to address the 
plight of  exemplary pagans and innocent beasts, they flirted with the time- 
worn doctrine of  metempsychosis--a heretical opinion, but one which yielded 
a far more sympathetic theodicy than annihilation. 
3. P L A T O N I S M ,  P R E E X I S T E N C E  AND T R A N S M I G R A T I O N  
In seventeenth-century England there was considerable interest in the ancient 
view of  the transmigration of  the soul. In large measure this was owing to a 
revival of  Renaissance Platonism and Hermeticism. The Cambridge Plato- 
nists, at the forefront of  this revival, were concerned to maintain a spiritual 
view of  nature by wedding the new scientific approach to an arcane philosophi- 
cal tradition. The  Cambridge circle included Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph 
Cudworth, Henry More and George Rust. At Oxford, Joseph Glanvill and 
John Norris also came under  their influence. 
The Cambridge Platonists were generally antipathetic to the empiricism of  
Bacon and the materialism of Hobbes. While they welcomed Descartes as an 
ally in the fight against materialism and atheism, they generally took excep- 
vols. (London: Thomas Tegg, 1845), I, 81; III, 90. Annihilation is also mentioned by Wilson, A 
Commentary, 588, and Parr, A Plaine Exposition, 89. 
59 Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ed. R. H. A. Robbins (Clarendon: Oxford, 198~), 1.54 (57). 
6o Another way of ameliorating the problem of animal pain was to argue that animal suffering 
was inconsequential when compared to human suffering. Thus Richard Baxter argued that 
animals were "less capable of misery," and that brutes, lacking doubts and fears, were "far more 
happy than my selfl" (Of the Immortality of Marts Soul [London: Pr. for B. Simmons, x682], 19f.). 
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tion to the doctrine of  the beast-machine. Cudworth, for example, waxed 
enthusiastic over Descartes's "rediscovery" of  atomic theory, yet saw in the 
Cartesian extension of  mechanism to the animate world a threat to a spiritual 
view of  nature. Prophetically, he perceived how easily the beast-machine could 
become the man-machine. 6' Cudworth thus resisted the extreme dualism of  
Descartes, suggesting that the activity of  the animal world resulted neither 
from the deterministic workings of  some organic machine, nor from continual 
interventions into the causal nexus by the Deity, but rather from the workings 
of  "plastic nature." By "plastic" or "artificial" nature, Cudworth meant pur- 
poseful, but nonconscious powers operative in nature. These powers fell un- 
der God's general providential design, yet were not directed by him. The 
instinctive behavior of  animals--nonintcntional, yet purposeful--was, for 
Cudworth, a conspicuous example of  how plastic powers operated. 62 Even the 
human mind, he pointed out, evidenced unconscious activity, as for example 
in dreaming.63 Cudworth's "plastic nature" thus represented a middle position 
between those who would banish spiritual substance from the universe alto- 
gether, and those who have the world so permeated with spirit that the distinc- 
tion between the two disappeared. 
Cudworth's colleague Henry More also offered perceptive criticisms of  both 
materialism and panpsychism, proposing in their place his own often unwieldy 
synthesis of  contemporary science, Hermetic cosmology, and Christianity.64 
More followed Cudworth in asserting that while the natural world was not the 
body of  God, neither was it totally devoid of  his ongoing influence.65 
Materialism, however, was by no means the Platonists' only concern. 
Equally, they were concerned at the growth of Calvinism, which had been on 
the ascendency in England since the turn of the century. Chief amongst their 
reservations concerning this austere faith were questions to do with predestina- 
tion and the justice of  God. Why would God hold us responsible for Adam's 
sin, they wanted to know? Did God create the vast majority of  the human race 
for the express purpose of  sending them to hell (as Calvinism implied)? Why 
should whole nations of  heathens die without any hope of heaven, simply 
6, A fear which he shared with Descartes's critics. See Descartes, Reply to Objections IV; HR II, 
235. Cf. J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1951), 8. See also Rosenfieid, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine. 
6~ Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe, I, 243. 
6s Ibid., ~47. 
64 See, e.g., A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings olD. Henry More, 2nd ed. (London: Pr. 
by J. Flesher for W. Morden, x66~). Also Richard Popkin, "The Third Force in Seventeenth- 
Century Philosophy," 55-58 . 
65 Popkin, "The Third Force in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy," 57f.; B. P. Copenhaver, 
"Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution: Henry More, Joseph Raphson, Isaac 
Newton and Their Predecessors," Annals of Science XXXVII (198o): 522f. 
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because they were geographically remote from the cradle of  Christianity? 
What hope of  salvation was there for those who lived before the time of  
Christ? The solution to these quandaries lay in the direction of  Platonic no- 
tions of  God's goodness and of  the human soul--a  path which had its logical 
terminus in the  doctrines of  preexistence and metempsychosis. 
Intrinsic to Calvinism is the nominalist notion that God's goodness is differ- 
ent in kind from our  own. Whatever God wills, is good. Human reason cannot 
fathom divine justice. The  Calvinism which prevailed during the Interregnum 
had no difficulty with this harsh solution. The  Platonists, however, found it 
rather unsatisfactory. As Joseph Glanvill declared: "For the first Errour, 
which is the ground of  the rest, is, That  things are good and just, because God 
Wills them so to be; and if that be granted, we are disabled from using the 
arguments taken from natural Notions . . . .  I f  there be no settled Good and 
Evil, Immutable and Indepefident on any Will or Understanding, then God 
may have made his reasonable Creatures on purpose to damn them for- 
ever. ''66 But once it was accepted that God's goodness was similar in kind to 
our own, how was this goodness to be reconciled with a world in which, as one 
writer put it, "many whole nations both of  old and at this present day were so 
overrun with all kinde of  barbarity, ferity, and bestial lust, so utterly estranged 
from the knowledge of  God and the love of  vertue. . . -?67 For the Platonists, 
such a reconciliation was to be afforded by the doctrine of  the preexistence of  
souls, described enthusiastically by Joseph Glanvill as "an Antient and Proba- 
ble opinion, w h i c h . . ,  may contribute somewhat to the clearing and vindica- 
tion of  the Divine Attributes. ''6s 
The idea of  the soul's preexistence had been introduced into Christianity 
by the most controversial of  the Church Fathers--Origen.  This platonizing 
theologian, long regarded with considerable suspicion in the West, had been 
restored to grace during the Renaissance, owing to the efforts of  such luminar- 
ies as Erasmus and Thomas More. Amongst the Cambridge Platonists he had 
a devoted following. It is almost certain that the work which reintroduced his 
theology to the seventeenth-century world--A Letter of Resolution concerning 
Origen and the Chief of His Opinions (1661 )--originated from within the Cam- 
66 Preface to George Rust's A Discourse of Truth, in Glanvill, Two Choice and Vseful Treatises 
(London: Pr. for Sam. Collins, 1682). Cf. also George Rust, A Discourse of Truth, passim, and 
Gianvill, Lux Orientalis, ch. VII, both in Two Choice and Vseful Treatises; Henry More, An Explanation 
of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (London: Pr. by James Fiesher for W. Morden, 166o), 5o4, Divine 
Dialogues, (London: Pr. by James Flesher, a668), I, 361-63; Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise concerning 
Eternal and Immutable Morality, bk. 2, appended to The True Intellectual System of the Universe, ed. 
John Harrison. 
sT [George Rust?], A Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the Chief of his Opinions (London, 
1661), 29. 
eSJoseph Glanvill, Lux Orientalis, Preface. 
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bridge circle.69 In this work, the author (probably George Rust) pointed out 
that virtually all of the apparent injustices and inequalities of the present life 
could be explained by the hypothesis of preexisting souls. Those born in less 
than ideal circumstances beyond the boundaries of Christendom had been 
condemned to their plight by virtue of infractions committed in a previous 
existence. "IT]hose wretched souls," said Rust, "had of old by their long revolt 
from God and the laws of his righteous Kingdome highly deserv'd this 
scourge." It was "by choice and affection" that these souls "fell off to in other 
regions of the world."7o A similar doctrine of preexistence can be found in 
More and Glanvill.7~ 
Yet, while they were committed to preexistence, none of the Cambridge 
69 The work is traditionally attributed to George Rust, but cf. D. P. Walker, The Decline of lieU 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 124f. 
7o Rust, Letter ofResolutwn, 31 . Cf. Origen, De principiis, I.viii, ll.ix. We also find this view in 
Plotinus, Enneads, IV.iii. 12-16. It is possible that Origen and Plotinus learned this doctrine from 
their common teacher, Ammonius Saccus. 
7' More, Divine Dialogues, I, 503; Glanvill, Lux Orientalis, passim. Also C. P., A Dissertation 
concerning the Pre-existent.) of Souls (London: Pr. for J. Wickens and Rob. Kettlewell, 1684). A 
number of refutations of the doctrine also appeared at this time. See Isaac Barrow, Anirrut 
Human~e Corporibus non Prteexistent, in Works, IV (London: Pr. by M. Fiesher for Brabazon Aylmer, 
1687); Samuel Parker, A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophy with an Account of the 
Origtnian Hypothesis concerning the Prexistence of Souls (Oxford: Pr. by W. Hall for R. Davis, a666); 
Edward Warren, No Pr~eexistence (London: Pr. by T.R. For Samuel Thomson, 1667). 
Arguments about preexistence, it should be noted, were related not only to theodicy, but to a 
more general debate about the origin and destiny of  the human soul. In seventeenth-century 
England there was a lively controversy over whether human souls preexisted, were infused into 
the embryo by God at or shortly after conception, or were produced ex traduce by the parents 
(traduction). The  dispute also extended to the fate of the soul at the end of life. Whereas the 
orthodox belief was that the human soul was an incorporeal substance which was liberated from 
the body at death and took its place in heaven or hell to await judgment, "mortalists" (who 
numbered in their ranks John Milton, the young Thomas Browne, Thomas Hobbes, and Richard 
Overton) maintained that at death the human soul perished with the body, or "slept" until the 
resurrection and the day of  judgment. See, e.g., John Milton, The Christian Doctrine, bk. l, chs. 7, 
13, in Works, ed. F. Patterson (New York: Columbia University Press, x931-fiS), XV, 37-55 ,215-  
51; Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, 1. 7 (8); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 38, 44, 46; Richard 
Overton, Marts Mortallitie. For the background of this debate see Norman T. Burns, Christian 
Mortalismfrom Tyndale to Milton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972 ) and Philip C. 
Almond, "The Journey of  the Soul in Seventeenth-Century English Platonism," History of Euro- 
pean Ideas 13 (1991): 775-91. The controversy was rekindled in the early 17oos by William 
Coward, who, perhaps inspired by Locke's "thinking matter," again vigorously set forth the 
mortalist position. See, e.g., Coward, Second Thoughts concerning the Human Soul (London, 17o2 ). 
Clarke, Turner,  Baxter, Dodwell, Sykes, Law and Peckard all joined the eighteenth-century 
dispute. For a summary of  the arguments see Caleb Fleming, A Survey of the Search after Souls 
(London, 1758). These controversies are relevant to our present discussion because they focussed 
upon what was then seen to be "the essential difference between Man and other Animals," the 
confounding of  which, as one writer expressed it, "strikes at the whole of Religion, and renders 
That unnecessary, and Man contemptible" (M. S., A Philosophical Discourse o f . . .  Rational and 
Irrational Souls [London: Pr. by Richard Baldwin, 1695], 34). 
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circle publicly endorsed reincarnation. Exceptions might be made in the case 
of  those dying in infancy. T h e  souls of  dying infants, according to Glanvill, 
return to a state of  insensibility and await embodiment in another terrestrial 
vehicle.7, Cudworth also tentatively proposed that the souls o f  brutes might, 
like those of  their human counterparts, preexist.73 But this was as far as it 
went. Others less intimately involved in the Cambridge circle, however, took 
the plunge, proposing that the souls of  the departed may again enter human 
bodies. 
Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont  was the son of  the famous Belgian 
physician and chemist Jean Baptista van Helmont. A friend of  Henry  More, 
he combined interests in Lurianic cabbalism and Platonism. Van Helmont 
argued that one lifetime was too brief  for repentance and salvation. Moreover, 
those dying young, those born before the birth of  Christ, and "such imperfect 
Creatures as Fools and Naturals, Abortives and Monsters"mall were at some- 
thing of  a disadvantage (at least according to the prevailing Calvinist and 
Arminian soteriologies). Such short or impoverished lives could only be com- 
pensated for, van Helmont believed, by the soul's rebirth in another body.7~ 
The anonymous "N. N." also held that one lifetime might not be sufficient to 
ensure a reasonable chance of  salvation. In his Letter to a Gen t l eman . . .  concern- 
ing the Revolution of  Humane Souls (169o), he repeated a number  of  van 
Helmont's arguments. All men, in all ages, he says, who have died without 
hearing the Gospel, "shall live again in the World in some Age and Place 
where they shall hear it, before the End of  the World."75 And so it is that God 
"does give unto every Man, a long day of  Visitation, even of  a thousand years, 
to live upon this Earth, that he may be converted . . . .  ,,76 
Neither of  these theodicies involve a fully-fledged metempsychosis, in 
which human souls enter the bodies of  animals. The Platonists' concern only 
extended to "brutish" nations, but  not to brutes themselves. Glanvill, admit- 
tedly, had earlier toyed with "Pythagisme." In a letter penned in 166 l, presum- 
ably to George Rust, he wrote with some enthusiasm of  the newly revived 
origenism, noting that the hypothesis of  preexistence naturally tends towards 
metempsychosis: 
7, Glanvill, Lux Orientalis, ~4. 
7s Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe, III, 9 o. 
~4 F. M. van Helmont,  The Paradoxal Discourses of F. M. van Helraont concerning the Macrocosm 
and Microcosm (London: Pr. by J.C. and Freeman Collins, for Robert Ketdewell, a685), 1o7; Two 
Hundred Queries Moderately Propounded concerning the Doctrine of the Revolution of Humane Souls 
(London: Pr. for Rob. Kettlewell, 1684), 3f., 16, 134, and passim. Seder Olam (London: Pr. for 
Sarah Howkins, 1694) gives a strict timetable for the cycle of rebirths. 
75 N.N., A Letter to a Gentleman Touching the Treatise... concerning the Revolution of Humane Souls 
(London: Pr. for A. Churchill, 169o), 16. 
Ibid., 8. 
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For (1) the divine goodness which regardes all his creatures seems to require it, other- 
wise some will bee faultlessly miserable; for what account els can be given of the state of 
beasts who some of them are all their lives subject to the tyrannicall tastes of merciless 
man, except wee suppose them to have deserv'd this severe discipline by some former 
delinquencyes. (2) Some men seem naturally prepar'd for a descent into bruite bodyes, 
by the bruitish dispositions, and have almost nothing to speak them betterwhile in 
humane flesh but speech and their external persons . . . .  (3) The next state is a state of 
punishment to the wicked, and therefore worse than this, and therefore they will have 
worse bodyes.....77 
It interest ing that  in this letter Glanvill also makes r e fe rence  to the Cartesian 
beast-machine.  He  says that we have no  reason to conclude that animals have 
immater ia l  souls, and that God certainly could make  such "machinas."  Glan- 
viii, at this stage at least, believed that  the justice o f  God ex tended  to all his 
creatures ,  and  that  some account  o f  their  suf fer ing  was required.TS But  
Glanvill never  seemed to follow this t h ro u g h  in his ma tu re  writings. 
Others  in the Cambr idge  circle had spoken o f  terrestr ial  life as essentially 
animal  in character .  More,  for  example ,  seemed to r ega rd  all material  bodies 
or  "terrestr ial  vehicles" as animal bodies. Thus ,  when  "Adam's Soul descended  
into the p r e p a r e d  Mat ter  o f  the ear th ,"  he became "a down-r ight  Terrestrial 
Animal."79 Idolatry,  according to More,  was "the proper fruit of the Animal life," 
and  was manifes ted in the worship o f  the sun and moon.  Idolaters  thus lived 
the lives o f  animals. More,  curiously enough ,  held  that  e lephants  and  apes 
worsh ipped  the sun and  moon,  and  was thereby led to the conclusion that  
"what  the Apes and these Elephants in Mauritania do, the same is d o n e  by the 
Idolaters o f  the East Indies. ''s~ 
We should note  in passing that  the view that  animals could enter ta in  senti- 
ments  o f  religion was not  mere ly  one  o f  More's flights o f  fancy. T h e  piety o f  
e lephants  had been  originally r e p o r t e d  by Pliny, who probably served as the 
source o f  not  only More's  views, but  also those o f  Monta igne and a n u m b e r  o f  
77 Glanvill's letter reproduced in Charles Mullett, "A Letter by Joseph Glanvill on the Future 
State," Huntington Library Quarterly I 0937):  447-56- Again, this sounds very much like Plotinus. 
Speaking on the descent of  the soul, Plotinus stated: "all that is fixed is that each several soul 
descends to a recipient indicated by affinity of  condition; it moves towards the thing which it 
The re  resembled, and enters, accordingly, into the body of  man or animal" (Enneads, tr. S. 
MacKenna and B. Page [Chicago: William Benton, 1959l, IV.iii. 12). 
7s In Lux Orientalis Glanvill stresses that  divine justice is universal: "For this Justice is but  the 
distributing to every thing according to the requirements of  its nature.  And that benign wisdom that  
contrived and framed the natures of all Beings, doubtless so provided that they should be suitably 
furnisht  with all things proper  for their respective conditions" (97). 
~gMore, Conjectura Cabbalistica, 28, in A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of D. Henry 
More. 
so More, Grand Mystery of Godliness, 5 o. Cf. John  Smith, "An Account of  Mistakes about  Reli- 
gion," Select Discourses (London: Pr. byJ .  Flesher for W. Morden,  166o), 375. 
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seventeenth-century natural historians, s' Somewhat earlier, in 1622, Godfrey 
Goodman had actually produced a complete work on the topic, entitled The 
Creatvres Praysing God: or The Religion of Dumbe Creatures. Goodman ventured 
the thesis "that the dumbe Creatures haue likewise their proper kinde of  
religion as well as men, and that they are very deuout, godly, zealous, strict 
and most religious in their owne kinde. TM He went on to show that animals 
acknowledge one God (albeit implicitly), immutable, eternal, good, simple, 
wise, free, powerful, and providential.Ss The piety of  animals was defended 
even in the eighteenth century by Richard Dean, the Curate of  Middleton, 
who announced that "it is notorious to the World, that numbers of  them 
[animals] make as great a Point of  attending at Church on public Service day, 
as the most rigid pietists do."s4 One can only wonder what transpired at the 
curate's Sunday services. 
For the Platonists, at any rate, "animal religion" meant something quite 
different. For them it was what true piety had degenerated into, just  as men 
might degenerate into animals. If  animals were in fact degenerate men, then 
the beasts could be said to be morally culpable, and thus to have deserved their 
plight. Accordingly, Glanvill suggested that Noah's son Ham, traditionally 
regarded as the father of  heresy, had spawned a race of  apes.S5 This conjec- 
ture sat well with the general theory of  degeneration current  at the time, 
according to which the world was in a state of  gradual decline, s6 The  human 
race was implicated in this decline, for as John Dove put it, "man which is a 
lesser worlde declineth, and it followeth therefore as a good consequent, that 
8, See, e.g., Montaigne, "An Apology for Raymond Sebond," Essays, tr. John Florio (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, n.d.), II, 18o; Wolfgang Franzius, The History of Brutes (London: Pr. by 
E. Oakes, for Frances Haley, 167o ), 25; John Johnston, A Description of the Nature of Four-Footed 
Beasts (Amsterdam, 1678 ), t8. Cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist., x.41. 
s, Goodman, Creatvres Praysing God, 4 f. 
s3 Ibid., 9-12. On animal prayers, see also Abbot, An Exposition, 471. 
Richard Dean, An Essay on the Future Life of Brutes, Introduced with Observations upon Evil, Its 
Nature, and Origin, 2 vols. (Manchester: Pr. byJ. Harrop, 1767), II, 7 t. 
S~Joseph Glanvill, Scepsis Scientifica, ed. John Owen (London: Kegan Paul and Co., 1885), 
2 1 1 .  
86 On the theory of the world's degeneration, see Victor Harris, All Coherence Gone (London: 
Frank Cass, 1966); D. C. Allen, "The Degeneration of Man and Renaissance Pessimism," Studies in 
Philology 35 (1938): 2o2-27; Clarence Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, a967), a62f., 379-92; Margaret Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 254-94; George Wil- 
liamson, "Mutability, Decay, and Seventeenth-Century Melancholy," Journal of English Literary 
History 2 (1935): a 2 l -  51. Views according to which degrees of degeneracy produced human 
diversity also provided a basis for racism. See, e.g., Richard Popkin, "The Philosophical Bases of 
Modern Racism," in Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts, ed. Craig Walton and J. Anton (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1974). 
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the g rea te r  wor lde  also do th  decline."s7 Some sections o f  the h u m a n  race had,  
in this scheme o f  things, sunk to the level o f  beasts. Perhaps  for  this reason  
there  was in the sixteenth century  some confus ion  as to whe the r  the natives o f  
the Americas  were h u m a n  or  not. According to Corneil le de  Pauw, Americans  
were at first t hough t  to be "orang-utangs,  o r  large monkeys,  that could be 
des t royed wi thout  r emorse  and without  reproach .  ''s8 Eventually,  as De Pauw 
tells it, a Pope  in tervened,  recognizing the Americans  as t rue  men.  
Despite such episodes which suggested that  men  could  natural ly degene r -  
ate to the level o f  beasts, few thinkers saw fit to develop a theory  according to 
which h u m a n  souls were re incarna ted  in animal bodies. T o  be sure, Or igen  
had believed that  degene ra t e  h u m a n  souls would be r e b o r n  in the bodies o f  
beasts. But  his embarrassed  seventeenth-century  disciples had  not  been  pre-  
pared  to go that  far, even denying  that  Or igen  had espoused  this e x t r e m e  
view.S9 T h e  sole English exponen ts  o f  this ancient  but  heretical  view were  
Lady Anne  Conway and  certain o f  the English radicals. 
4- T H E  E N G L I S H  R A D I C A L S ,  LADY A N N E  C O N W A Y  
AND T R A N S M U T A T I O N  
T h e  English Civil War  in the 164os had b ro u g h t  with it a general  relaxat ion o f  
censorship laws, allowing the circulation o f  texts, bo th  Renaissance and  con- 
t emporary ,  which chal lenged the prevail ing political, religious, and scientific 
status quo. While the Cambr idge  Platonists had  been somewhat  c i rcumspect  in 
their  rehabil i tat ion o f  Herme t i c  and Neopla tonic  ideals, the ideologues be- 
h ind  such radical  g roups  as the Diggers and  the Ranters  threw caut ion to the  
winds.9o In part icular,  the  medieval hierarchical  ontology which unde r l ay  
both  political and  natural  s t ructures  o f  domina t ion  was called into question.  
Ge r ra rd  Winstanley, l eader  o f  the Diggers, a n n o u n c e d  in 1649 that when  " the  
great  creator ,  Reason, made  the ear th  to be a c o m m o n  treasury,  to preserve  
beasts, birds, fishes and m a n . . ,  not  one  word  was s p o k e n . . ,  that  one  b ranch  
o f  mankind  should rule over  another."9, As the distinctions which placed o n e  
87John Dove, A Confutation of Atheism (London: Pr. by E. Able for H. Rockett, 16o5), 92. 
Corneille de Pauw, Recherches philosophiques, 1.3uf., in Was America a Mistake? ed. H. S. 
Commager and E. Giordanetti (New York: Harper, 1967), 9 o. 
~Transmigration was claimed to be "so ridiculous a doctrine" that such worthies as 
Pythagoras, Plato, and PIotinus were thought not to have personally believed it, though they 
dearly taught it. See The Athenian Gazette, April 1691 (vol. l, no. 7); Whitelock Bulstrode, An Essay 
in Defence of Pythagoras (London: Pr. by E. H. for Tho. Basset, 169~); Thomas Browne, Religio 
Medici, 1.37 (4o). 
9o The classic account of these movements is Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down 
(Ringwood: Penguin, 1975). 
9~ Gerrard Winstanley, A Declaration to the Powers of England (t649), quoted in Merchant, The 
Death of Nature, x~ 3. 
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man over  ano the r  were b roken  down,  so were the barriers between man and  
the beasts. T h e  whole o f  nature,  according to Winstanley, was permeated  with 
the one  divine spirit. T h e  divine Reason, he declared, "dwels in every crea- 
ture, according to the na ture  and being of  the creature."9, Man, he added,  
lives r ighteously by "looking upon  himself  as a fellow creature  ( though he be 
Lord  o f  all creatures)  to all o ther  creatures o f  all kinds; and in so doing to 
them as he would have them doe to him."93 T h e  Ranters were even m o r e  
overtly pantheistic. I t  was an early tenet o f  the Ranter  creed that "every 
creature  is God,  every creature  that ha th  life and  breath  being an efflux f rom 
God, and shall r e tu rn  into God again, be swaIlowed up in him as a d rop  is in 
the ocean."~ Small wonde r  that the Ranters were charged  with p ropaga t ing  
the doctr ine o f  re incarnat ion into animal bodies.95 Yet, despite the widespread 
dissemination o f  these he te rodox  opinions within these radical groups,  it was 
left to Lady A n n e  Conway to provide the most systematic defense o f  the view 
that brutes were so closely related to humans  that they might  in fu ture  lives be 
reborn  as men  or  women.  
Described by Richard Popkin as "perhaps the keenest metaphysician in 
England du r ing  this period,"  Lady Conway included in her  circle o f  f r iends 
van Helmont ,  Cudwor th ,  Glanvill, and  the ubiquitous H e n r y  More.96 H e r  
only published work is the pos thumous  Principles of  the Most Ancient and Modern 
Philosophy (I692).9~ This highly original piece contains searching criticisms o f  
the ontologies o f  Descartes, Hobbes,  and Spinoza, p ropos ing  in their place a 
monistic vitalism.ga It  fuses elements o f  English Platonism with continental  
9, Winstanley, Truth Lifting up Its Head above Scandals 0649 ), Works, x o 9. 
93 Ibid., 11 I. Richard Overton argued similarly that beasts were not given to man to eat in 
innocency, and that there was only a difference of degree between man and the animals. All 
creatures, he claimed, were mortal, and all would be raised from the dead at the resurrection 
(Mans MortaUitie, x7f., 5o). 
Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, 151. 
95 See, e.g., John Reeve and Lodowicke Muggleton, A Transcendent Spiritual Treatise (London: 
Pr. for the Authors, 1652), 42; Lawrence Clarkson [Claxton], Look about You for the Devil (London: 
Pr. for the Author, 1659), 98. These references establish only that the Ranters were accused of 
teaching this doctrine. Clarkson, however, had at one stage of his religious peregrinations been a 
Ranter, and thus had first-hand knowledge of their doctrines. Other members of these radical 
groups narrowed the gap between man and beast by asserting that both were equally mortal. See 
Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 122f. 
Popkin, "The Third Force in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy," 55- Conway's editor "I. C." 
(Possibly John Clark, or even professor of medicine Jodocus Crull), lacking prescience of the 
sensitivities of future generations, judged her to be "learned beyond her sex." 
97 Anne Finch Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (London, 1692 ). 
This English edition is a translation of the Latin version of 169o. A modern edition (English and 
Latin) is available, edited and introduced by Peter Lopston (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982 ). 
I have used the English edition of 1692. 
Given Conway's profession of this spiritual monism (not dissimilar to Berkeley's), her views 
regarding the metamorphosis of animals could not be the traditional metempsychosis which 
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cabbal ism,  b r i n g i n g  t o g e t h e r  P la tonic  no t ions  o f  p reex i s t ence  with cabbalistic 
metempsychosis .99 T h e  Principles possibly i n f luenced  Be rke l ey  a n d  Leibniz ,  
a n d  the  la t ter  was f o r  m a n y  years  p r e s u m e d  to bc  its a u t h o r ,  l~176 
As with the  Platonists ,  d e f e n s e  o f  the  jus t ice  o f  G o d  was o f  p a r a m o u n t  
i m p o r t a n c e  to the  Viscountess .  T h i s  just ice,  she dec lares ,  "mos t  g lor ious ly  
a p p e a r s  in the  T r a n s m u t a t i o n  o f  T h i n g s  ou t  o f  one  Species in to  a n o t h e r .  ''~o~ I n  
C o n w a y ' s  on to logy ,  t h e r e  a re  t h r e e  "essences o f  be ing ,"  b u t  m a n y  " m a n n e r s  o f  
existence.  '''~ G o d ,  the  h ighes t  be ing ,  is immutab l e ;  c rea tu res ,  the  lowest  be-  
ings,  a re  mutab le ;  Chris t ,  the  m e d i u m ,  par takes  o f  b o t h  k inds  o f  being.  T r a n s -  
m u t a t i o n  can  t h e r e f o r e  o c c u r  in all c rea tures ,  f o r  the i r  essence  is mutab le ,  
with species b o u n d a r i e s  ref lec t ing  on ly  superf icial  " m a n n e r s  o f  existence." 'o3 
T r a n s m u t a t i o n  m a y  take place u p w a r d s  o r  d o w n w a r d s .  C o n w a y  takes  as an  
e x a m p l e  o f  the  f o r m e r  the  c h a n g i n g  o f  a ho r se  in to  a human.~~ Horses ,  she 
says, have  b e e n  " i n d u e d  with d ivers  deg ree s  o f  p e r f e c t i o n " - - a  k ind  o f  knowl-  
edge ,  love, fear ,  c o u r a g e ,  m e m o r y  a n d  "divers  o t h e r  Qual i t ies  wh ich  a re  in 
Man."xo5 Because  it is the  n a t u r e  o f  every  c r e a t u r e  to t e n d  t o w a r d  a h i g h e r  
d e g r e e  o f  g o o d n e s s ,  a ho r se  will genera l ly  p e r f o r m  g o o d  service f o r  its mas ter ,  
a n d  so be d e e m e d  to  have  p e r f o r m e d  its d u t y  (unless the  ho r se  h i n d e r s  tha t  
g o o d  impul se  by v o l u n t a r y  t ransgress ion ,  o f  which  C o n w a y  asserts  ho r ses  are  
posits the rebirth of spiritual souls into material bodies (which implies dualism). Conway's own 
term for her doctrine is "transmutation," which is somewhat suggestive of alchemy. Conway, it 
should be added, is at times unclear on this issue, distinguishing, e.g., between the body of a horse 
and its spirit (69f.) 
One of the earliest writings of the cabbala, Bah/r, contains a doctrine of transmigration 
(secs. 86, 1o4, 135) which seems to have been developed as a theodicy. Migration into animal 
bodies appears somewhat later, in Teraunah (c. 13oo). Here it is stated that the souls of the 
righteous must pass through animal bodies. The strict rules concerning the slaughter and eating 
of animals were apparently intended to ensure the smooth passage of the human soul as it ascends 
from its animal body into its human body. See Gershom Scholem, Orig/~ of the Kabbalah (Prince- 
ton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 188-98, 458 . 
~~176 The Conway Letters, ed. Marjorie Nicolson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 193o ), 
454-56 9 
,oz Conway, Principles, 66. 
,o~ The terminology is reminiscent of Aquinas, who in his commentary on Aristotle's De anima 
distinguished kinds of soul (of which there were three) from modes of existence. Sancti Thomae 
Aquinatus in Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentariura, ed. M. Pirotta (Turin, 19~5), w167 ~55, 96o, 
279. 
,os Conway, Principles, 5 if. 
,04 Conway thus prefers Origen and Plotinus over Plato. Plato allowed that a human soul 
could atrophy and enter an animal body, but considered the reverse to be impossible. Animal 
souls were qualitatively different from human souls and could not enter a human body, for 
animal souls have no prior knowledge of the forms. See Phaedrus ~49b; cf. T/maeus 9 o. Origen and 
Plotinus had no qualms in asserting transmigration in both directions. See De principiis, I.viii; 
Enneads, IV.iii. 
,os Conway, Principles., 59. 
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capable). At dea th ,  the spirit o f  the horse,  now more  excellent  than before ,  will 
pass into the body  o f  ano the r  horse.  (God might  annihilate the horse 's  soul, 
hut  this would be unfai r ,  given the soul's improvement . )  In  its nex t  incarna- 
tion, the horse  may u n d e r g o  similar improvement ,  and so on. Now, asks 
Conway, is it possible "that  a horse  may always become bet te r  and  bet ter  ad 
infinitum, and yet so remain  a horse? ''~~ This  cannot  be, she says, part icularly 
if  it is g ran ted  that  the na tu re  o f  man  differs  f rom that o f  a horse  only in finite 
degrees.  For, as the horse  improves  in those qualities which it shares with man,  
it gradually approaches  humani ty .  Conway concludes that "a Horse  may in 
length o f  T ime ,  be in some measure  changed  into a Man."~o7 
This  r a the r  novel  view is made  mo re  plausible, Conway believed, if  ob- 
served t ransmuta t ions  in na ture  are  taken into account:  air can be changed  
into fire or  ae ther ;  one  metal can be changed into another ;  "Barley and wheat  
are convert ible one  into the o t h e r " - - f o r  there  are many  places (apparent ly)  
where  it is of ten  observed  that  when barley is sown, wheat  will spr ing up, and 
vice versa; worms change  into flies; and the co r rup ted  ear th  will br ing for th  
animals without  seed. los T ransmuta t ion  is the o rd e r  o f  nature ,  and  displays 
divine goodness.  God's  justice, says Conway, operates  "not  only in Men and  
Angels, but  in all Creatures." 'o9 
As an in t r iguing consequence  o f  this view, all creatures  become moral ly 
responsible. Animals  are subject to God's law, its sanctions and rewards.  "Ev- 
ery Crea ture  whatsoever ,  that  t ransgresseth this Law, is punished  for  it: But  
that  c rea ture  which observes and keeps it, ha th  this reward,  viz, to become 
better ."  It is fo r  this reason,  explains Conway, that  the serpent  was punished  
in the Genesis accoun t  o f  creation,  and  that the Jewish law had explicit penal- 
ties for  animal transgressions.  ,,o Animals, then,  are to a degree  responsible 
for  their  " m a n n e r  o f  existence," with their  suffer ing being directly related to 
their  "choices." 
T ransmuta t i on  was not  all one  way. At death,  three  possible fates awaited 
the h u m a n  soul. It  could become an angel, a devil, o r  a beast, d ep en d in g  on its 
actions in this world:  
And so here is a certain Justice in all these, as in all the Transmutation of Things from 
one Species into another, whether it be by ascending from the Ignobler or Baser unto 
the Nobler, or by descending into the contrary, there may be found the same Justice: 
For Example: Is it not just and equitable, if a Man on Earth lived a pure and Holy Life, 
like unto the Heavenly Angels, that he should be exalted to an Angelical Dignity after 
~o6 Ibid., 6of. 
~o7 Ibid., 61f. 
,08 Ibid., 64f. 
~o9 Ibid., 66f. 
~,o Ibid., 67. 
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Death, and be like unto them, over whom also the Angels rejoice? But i fa  Man here on 
Earth is more like a Devil raised from Hell than any other Creature, if he dies in such a 
State without Repentance, Shall not the same Justice tumble him down to Hell? and 
shall not such deservedly become like Devils, even as those who led an Angelical Life 
are made equal with the Angels? But if a Man hath neither lived an Angelical nor 
Diabolical, hut a Brutish, or at least-wise an Animal or Sensual Life on Earth; so that his 
Spirit is more like the Spirit of  a Beast than any other thing: Shall not the same Justice 
most justly cause, that as he is becom like a Brute, as to his Sp i r i t . . .  that he a l s o . . .  
should be changed into the Species of Beasts to whom he was inwardly most like, in 
Qualities and Conditions of  Mind ? H~ 
Ne i the r  r e t u r n  to this ear th  as a brute ,  no r  serving t ime in hell as a devil were  
t hough t  by Conway  to be  p e r m a n e n t ,  puni t ive  states. Both  were  to he t e m p o -  
ra ry  and  medicinal .  H' As for  the t radi t ional  view o f  an e te rn i ty  o f  t o rmen t s  in 
hell, this is d ismissed (as in most  o f  the C a m b r i d g e  Platonists a n d  radicals) as a 
"horr ib le  Idea or  Concep t ion  concern ing  God."  All pun i shmen t s ,  says Con-  
way, " tend  to the Crea tu re ' s  Advantage ;  so that  Grace  prevai ls  ove r  J u d g e -  
m e n t . " " s  Lady  Conway thus achieved a sound theodicy,  bu t  at the cost o f  
o r thodoxy .  
5" CONCLUSION 
T h e  seven teen th  century ,  as we have seen, gave rise to a bewi lder ing  a r ray  o f  
views abou t  an imals  and  their  souls. Yet a c o m m o n  fea tu re  o f  the  t hough t  o f  
the per iod  was that  the  conclusions one  could draw abou t  the  na tu re  o f  ani- 
mals  were  d e t e r m i n e d  by theological c o n c e r n s - - t h e  doc t r ines  o f  crea t ion  and  
r e d e m p t i o n ,  and  m o r e  part icularly,  views abou t  God ' s  goodness  and  provi-  
dence .  Only  w h e n  we have  g ra sped  the pr imacy  o f  this theological  a g e n d a  can 
we make  any  sense out  o f  the variety o f  views o f  animals  t hen  cur ren t ,  includ- 
ing the " e x t r e m e "  views o f  Descartes,  and  the colorful  conjectures  o f  the 
Platonists. Car tes ianism,  arguably,  p rov ided  the most  e legant  solution to the  
p r ob l em  o f  an imal  suf fer ing ,"4  and  one  m o r e  in line with the  new mechanica l  
science than  the fanciful  speculat ions o f  the  Platonists. T h i s  accounts  in large 
m eas u r e  fo r  its popula r i ty  in France  and  its m o r e  l imited success in England .  
Certainly the  Car tes ian hypothesis  was not  favored  mere ly  because  it legiti- 
ma ted  such pract ices as vivisection, as some  have implied., ,5 T h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  
animals  at this t ime was still re la ted m o r e  to thei r  perce ived  funct ion in the  
c rea ted  o r d e r  than  to their  intrinsic proper t ies .  Thus ,  even  those who  con- 
ceded  that  animals  could feel and  suf fe r  were  not  t he r eby  d e t e r r e d  f r o m  
~aa Ibid., 69f. 
"" Ibid., 74" 
Ha Ibid., 73" 
~'4 AS even Bayle seems to admit; see Dictionnaire, "Rorarius," n. C. 
~'5 See, e.g.,John Vyvyan, In Pity andAnger (London: Michael Joseph, 1969), a~-z4. 
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subject ing t h e m  to painful  expe r imen t s .  Man's  domin ion  ove r  na ture ,  r a t h e r  
than  some  theory  abou t  animals  be ing  au tomata ,  legi t imated such practices. ~16 
T h e  Platonists, fo r  thei r  par t ,  p rov ided  the only theodicy which could com-  
pete  with the Car tes ian  hypothesis .  T h e  Platonic renaissance in England  de-  
r ived m u c h  o f  its po tency  f r o m  the fact that  ne i ther  Calvinism n o r  Ar-  
minian ism could give a sat isfactory account  o f  the just ice o f  God.  T h e  doc-  
tr ines o f  preexis tence  and  metempsychos i s  thus m a d e  their  a p p e a r a n c e  as 
integral  par ts  o f  a genera l  assault  on  the rul ing theological dogmas .  
Interes t ingly ,  the anachronis t ic  Platonic views abou t  the na tu r e  o f  animals  
were  to outlive the beas t -machine .  E igh teen th-cen tury  discussions o f  an imal  
suf fe r ing  were  of ten  i n f o r m e d  by Platonic phi losophy,  a l t hough  m o r e  a t ten-  
t ion was now paid  to the pr inciple  o f  p len i tude  than  to the not ion  o f  mig ra t ing  
souls.-7 T h e  beas t -machine ,  however ,  was  rare ly  men t ioned .  In  the nine-  
teen th  century,  the  fo r tunes  o f  theodicy as appl ied  to an imal  su f fe r ing  u n d e r -  
went  a d rama t i c  reversal .  T h e  acceptance  o f  Darwin 's  t heo ry  o f  evolut ion by 
na tura l  selection s tood the old o r d e r  on its head.  Now, the na tu ra l  world  was 
to place constraints  u p o n  theology.  Not  only did  evolut ion by na tura l  selection 
do away with the  g r o u n d s  fo r  asser t ing a radical discontinuity be tween  h u m a n  
and  o the r  species, bu t  the  ceaseless and  bloody conflicts be tween  the species 
which lay at its hea r t  cast into d o u b t  cher ished beliefs abou t  p u r p o s e  in na tu r e  
a n d  God ' s  provident ia l  design.  " I  canno t  p e r s u a d e  myself ,"  Darwin  wrote ,  
" that  a benefic ient  and  o m n i p o t e n t  God would have des ignedly  crea ted  the  
I c h n e u m o n i d a e  with the express  in tent ion o f  their  feed ing  within the living 
bodies  o f  Caterpil lars ,  o r  tha t  a cat should  play with mice. ' ' " s  Darwin  h imse l f  
,6 Thus Guerrini points out that vivisectors did not rely on Cartesian arguments to justify 
their experiments, "Animal Experimentation in Seventeenth-Century England," 397. Signifi- 
cantly, it was the Cartesian Norris who preached kindness to animals; Essay, 59, ~oo. 
-7 See, e.g., John Bruckner, A Philosophical Survey of the Creation (London: Pr. forJ. Johnson & 
J. Payne, 1768); James Granger, An Apology for the Brute Creation (London: Pr. for T. Davies, 
1772); John Hildrop, Free Thoughts upon the Brute Creation (London: Pr. for R. Minors, 1742); 
Soame Jenyns, Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil (London: Pr. for R. & J. Dodsley, 
1757), Disquisitions on Several Subjects (Dublin: Pr. for R. Moncrieffe et al., 1782); Andrew Ramsay, 
The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, 2 vols. (Glascow: Pr. by Robert Foulis, 
1748), I, 346-87; James Rothwell, A Letter to the Rev. Mr. Dean, of Middleton (London: Pr. in the 
year 1769). 
,s  Cited in The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, ed. Francis Darwin (London: John Murray, 
1888), II, 31 ~. Cf. J. S. Mill's observation: "If a tenth part of the pains which have been expended in 
finding benevolent adaptations in all nature, had been employed in collecting evidence to blacken 
the character of the Creator, what scope for comment would have been found in the entire exis- 
tence of the lower animals, divided, with scarcely an exception, into devourers and devoured, and a 
prey to a thousand ills from which they are denied the faculties necessary for protecting themselves! 
If we are not obliged to believe the animal creation to be the work of a demon, it is because we need 
not suppose it to have been made by a Being of infinite power" ("Nature," Three Essays on Religion, 
3rd ed. [London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1874], 58. 
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exemplifies the new order of things--what is observed in nature dictates what 
can be believed about God. This priority, patently, was not that of  the seven- 
teenth century, and we must keep this fact firmly in mind when we attempt to 
interpret the curious biology of  the age of  reason. 
Bond University. 
